This sweeping introduction to the science of virtual environment technology masterfully integrates research and practical applications culled from a range of disciplines, including psychology, engineering, and computer science.

Fragt man heute Vertreter verschiedener Disziplinen nach der Bedeutung des Hannoveraner Universalgelehrten Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, so hort man jeweils immer wieder: Leibniz hat Bedeutendes fur unser Fach geleistet. Leibniz beeindruckt nicht nur durch die Exzellenz seiner Leistung, sondern auch durch die Breite seiner Betatigungsfelder. Der aus einer Ringvorlesung an der Leibniz Universitat Hannover hervorgegangene Band fuhrt nun an die Vielfalt der von Leibniz ausgehenden der Leistungen und Anregungen heran. Insbesondere behandeln die Beitrage die Bedeutung von Leibniz fur die Geschichtswissenschaft, die (...) Theologie, die Philosophie, die Rechtswissenschaft und Juristerei, die Politikberatung, das Versicherungswesen, die Mathematik, die Ingenieurwissenschaften und die Sprachwissenschaft. Abgerundet wird der Band durch eine Einfuhrung von Werner Eisner und eine biographische Skizze aus der Feder von Eike Christian Hirsch. (shrink)

Early in his development, love played the central role in Hegel’s attempts to overcome fragmentation and division both within society and within the self. This initial conception of love was decisively shaped by his early romantic contemporaries. Hegel soon came to see, however, that love so conceived threatens a sense of individuality intrinsic to modern identity and cannot be a basis for modern social cohesion. This form of love binds people so closely that it becomes oppressive. Hegel’s mature alternative to (...) this early view incorporates love into a more complex conception of modern society. Here, love finds expression and plays a central role in the family, but broader social cohesion is underwritten by a diverse range of affective attachments other than love. This strategy motivates a surprisingly subtle account of patriotism together with substantial emphasis on the role of religious institutions in shaping our political dispositions. (shrink)

Dieser interdisziplinär angelegte Sammelband erkundet die Relevanz wissenschaftlicher Erhellungen der Lebenswelt für Systematische und Praktische Theologie. Dazu begibt er sich in ein Gespräch mit philosophischer Phänomenologie, Religionsphilosophie und Sozialwissenschaft. Die einzelnen Beiträge markieren aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven das Interesse von Theologie an "Gelebter Religion". Abgeleitet wird daraus die Bedeutung der Phänomenologie für die Konstitution der Praktischen Theologie.

This paper is about the semantic analysis of referentially opaque verbs like seek and owe that give rise to nonspecific readings. It is argued that Montague's categorization (based on earlier work by Quine) of opaque verbs as properties of quantifiers runs into two serious difficulties: the first problem is that it does not work with opaque verbs like resemble that resist any lexical decomposition of the seek ap try to find kind; the second one is that it wrongly predicts de (...) dicto (i.e. narrow scope) readings due to quantified noun phrases in the object positions of such verbs. It is shown that both difficulties can be overcome by an analysis of opaque verbs as operating on properties. This is a strongly modified version of a paper entitled lsquoDo We Bear Attitudes towards Quantifiers?rsquo that I have presented at conferences in Gosen (Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft), Ithaca (SALT I), and Konstanz (Lexikon). I owe a special debt to Hans Kamp and Arnim von Stechow for shaping my views on the subject of this paper during the past ten years or so. Comments from and discussions with the following friends and colleagues have also led to considerable improvements: Heinrich Beck, Steve Berman, David Dowty, Veerle van Geenhoven, Fritz Hamm, Irene Heim, Wolfgang Klein, Angelika Kratzer, Michael Morreau, Barbara Partee, Mats Rooth, Roger Schwarzschild, Wolfgang Sternefeld, Emil Weydert, Henk Zeevat, and three referees. (shrink)

Die sich um 1800 neu konstituierende Disziplin der Biologie und die idealistische Naturphilosophie Schellings bemuhen sich in ihrer Frontstellung gegen einen unkritisch und ontologisch verstandenen Mechanismus um eine dem Leben angemessene Beschreibung und Erklarung der Lebensphanomene. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im ersten Teil der vorliegenden Studie das Werk des Naturforschers Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer im Kontext der zeitgenossischen philosophischen und naturforschenden Diskussionen verortet, bevor im zweiten Teil die Bedeutung von Kielmeyers Phanomenologie des Organischen fur die systematische Ausarbeitung des Schelling'schen Systems der (...) Naturphilosophie aufgezeigt wird. In their animosity towards an uncritical and ontology-based mechanism, both the new discipline of biology, which was becoming established around 1800, and Schellings idealistic natural philosophy strove for a description and explanation of the phenomena of life which were pertinent to life. Against this backdrop, the work of the naturalist Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer is placed in the context of contemporary philosophical and naturalist discussions of the time in the first part of this study before the significance of Kielmeyers phenomenology of the organic for the systematic development of Schellings system of natural philosophy is shown in the second part. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to propose a way to determine to what extent a hypothesis H is confirmed if it has successfully passed a classical significance test. Bayesians have already raised many serious objections against significance testing, but in doing so they have always had to rely on epistemic probabilities and a further Bayesian analysis, which are rejected by classical statisticians. Therefore, I will suggest a purely frequentist evaluation procedure for significance tests that should also be accepted by (...) a classical statistician. This procedure likewise indicates some additional problems of significance tests. In some situations, such tests offer only a weak incremental support of a hypothesis, although an absolute confirmation is necessary, and they overestimate positive results for small effects, since the confirmation of H is often rather marginal in these cases. In specific cases, for example, in cases of ESP-hypotheses, such as precognition, this phenomenon leads too easily to a significant confirmation and can be regarded as a form of the probabilistic falsification fallacy. (shrink)

Thomas More’s Utopia is an iridescent and enigmatic work which evades a consistent interpretation. Throughout the entire dialogue, many contradictory positions are argued for, and More’s play with telling names makes it difficult to determine which person’s position we should embrace. In order to evade these problems, the paper suggests reading More’s work as a philosophical dialogue with the reader, in which More invites us to evaluate the different positions contained in the work against our own back- ground. In (...) this sense, More’s Utopia is a proper piece of philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophers have usually highlighted how the weakness and paucity of historical evidence underdetermine the choice between rival historical explanations. Focusing underdetermination on the link between theory and evidence comes, I argue, with three assumptions: competing hypotheses are easy to generate, investigators agree on the constitution and interpretation of the evidence and a plurality of hypotheses is a useful evil to reach consensus. The last assumption implies that the sustained coexistence of incompatible hypotheses is considered as a scientific failure. I argue (...) that this negative vision of sustained disagreement has monistic undertones. By drawing from a case study in evolutionary biology, this paper defends a form of scientific pluralism. Firstly, I show that underdetermination is not only found at the inferential level but also at the level of the constitution and interpretation of the evidence, on the choice of investigative scaffolds and when interpreting background theories. Because of that, competing hypotheses exhibit a degree of methodological incommensurability. While catastrophic from a monistic standpoint, I defend that scientific pluralism gives a different, and I think richer, account of such situations. On the plus side, competing approaches benefit from their sustained coexistence and interaction. I argue that this generates direct and indirect epistemic goods independently of whether the controversy is solved. Scientific pluralism also shifts our attention from achieving consensus to managing disagreement. The challenge becomes to maintain the conditions for fruitful interactions in a community with incommensurable approaches and heterogeneous expertise. (shrink)

As the embodiment of a border-crosser between science, literature, and occultism, the writer Stanisław Przybyszewski also represents the ambivalent consciousness of the avant-garde. Behind the facade of imperial Berlin, he opens up a world of wonder, demons and ecstasy. Without using a normative understanding of modernity, this article attempts to portray Przybyszewski as proof of the irreconcilable tensions between rationalism and irrationalism in the period around 1900. Central to this argumentation are his spiritual references, such as satanism and occultism.

What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain (...) data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not. (shrink)

The concept of situatedness turns away from ideals of objectivity “from nowhere” and denotes the marking of the place from which a discourse or a theoretical approach takes its starting point. Theories of different traditions have emphasised the need to reflect on their own situatedness in order to avoid mere doxa. Since “situation” is one of the basic concepts of existential phenomenologies (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), it can serve as a terminological foundation for a reflection of embodied standpoints. The space- and (...) perception-theoretical difference between situation and position – developed in phenomenology of perception and space orientation – can be further thought politically and expanded into “situational difference”. With the ambivalent intermediate position between the place of speaking and the space of the political, an analytical differentiation would be available that can lead to a phenomenological explication of the logic of the politics of positioning. (shrink)

Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications (...) of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again. (shrink)

Diese Analytische Einführung behandelt die wichtigsten Grundfragen und -probleme der Erkenntnistheorie und enthält eine ausführliche Darstellung von Positionen und Argumenten aus der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. Sie richtet sich an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fachgebiete, bietet aber auch für philosophische Kenner eine gewinnbringende kritische Orientierung. Für die zweite Auflage wurde der Text vollständig überarbeitet, um die jüngsten Entwicklungen im Themenfeld zu berücksichtigen. Am Ende jedes Kapitels gibt es nun Studienfragen zur selbständigen Rekapitulation und kommentierte Hinweise auf wichtige neue und weiterführende Literatur. (...) Im Anhang finden sich Vorschläge für thematisch fokussierte Lehrveranstaltungen auf der Grundlage dieses Buches. Behandelt werden u.a. die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundbegriffe (Überzeugung, Wahrheit, Wissen und Rechtfertigung) sowie unterschiedliche Antworten auf die Fragen nach der Struktur, dem Umfang und den Quellen menschlichen Wissens. Die spezifischen Wissensarten kommen ausführlich zur Sprache (neben der Wahrnehmung insbesondere apriorisches Wissen, Erinnerung, Selbstwissen sowie sozialer Wissenstransfer und nicht-deduktive Schlussverfahren). Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt außerdem auf der Rolle der Erkenntnistheorie innerhalb der Philosophie sowie ihrem Verhältnis zu den Einzelwissenschaften. (shrink)

This is a new (and for the first time complete) edition of a speech about Buddhism by Rudolf Otto from 1913. This speech is his first academic reflexion of his journey around the world and his most detailed explanation of his view on this religion. In the first part of his speech Otto compares Buddhism with Christianity and finds a lot of parallels. In the second part he defines differences between these two religions and proclaims – from a Christian perspective (...) – Christianity as more valuable than Buddhism. The preface puts the speech into its context: Otto’s relationship to and his knowledge of Buddhism (1), the history of publication of this speech (2), Otto’s specific view on Buddhism in comparison to his contemporaries (3), the meaning of this speech in his œuvre (4) and explanations about the edition (5). The editor has the opinion, that this speech is an important transition from Ottos philosophy of religion to his main work The Idea of the Holy. It further is a good example of what Otto means when speaking about the comparison of religions. (shrink)

This is a new (and for the first time complete) edition of a speech about Buddhism by Rudolf Otto from 1913. This speech is his first academic reflexion of his journey around the world and his most detailed explanation of his view on this religion. In the first part of his speech Otto compares Buddhism with Christianity and finds a lot of parallels. In the second part he defines differences between these two religions and proclaims – from a Christian perspective (...) – Christianity as more valuable than Buddhism. The preface puts the speech into its context: Otto’s relationship to and his knowledge of Buddhism (1), the history of publication of this speech (2), Otto’s specific view on Buddhism in comparison to his contemporaries (3), the meaning of this speech in his œuvre (4) and explanations about the edition (5). The editor has the opinion, that this speech is an important transition from Ottos philosophy of religion to his main work The Idea of the Holy. It further is a good example of what Otto means when speaking about the comparison of religions. (shrink)

»Immanence of the forms« – the precise meaning of this very famous self-characterization of Aristotelian philosophy remained almost unexplored until recently. This article shows that the immanence means neither being contained, nor inherency, nor being spatially embraced, nor just and only inseparability from matter. Moreover, what is at stake is a special case of such inseparability, so that the Form – as something conceptually separated – nevertheless provides a full definition of the substantial object having that form. This account is (...) justified – as Michael Frede and Robert Heinaman have proved in their analysis of Metaph. VII 11 – on the basis of the causal role that the form in these cases has to play for the substantial object. It is also clear that only living forms can be immanent in this sense, not the mathematical forms or the forms of the artificial. Immanent forms are therefore for Aristotle exclusively souls of material living beings. The immanence of a form can be described – also according to the paradigm from the De anima – as the living activity of the materially existing body. (shrink)

The religious history of Bremen includes many impressive figures. Probably the most enigmatic figure of Bremen's church life around 1900 was the pastor at St. Martini, Albert Kalthoff. However, his impact reached beyond the borders of local religious history: He was important for the history of the Protestant culture of piety as well as for a religious historical analysis of reform attempts within Protestantism in Imperial Germany. Kalthoff was part of the leftist reform movement within German Protestantism. Furthermore, he can (...) be said to have had certain sympathies for the free thinker movement. This article wants to situate Kalthoff and his public works and goals in religious history with regard to the religious-confessional, cultural-religious, and cultural-political tendencies of his time. His example delineates the contours of a transitional space between Protestantism and the free thinker movement. (shrink)

Between 1783–1795 Johann Gottfried Herder wrote a manuscript „Anfangsgründe der Religion“, which is being published here for the first time. The manuscript, which is not in Herder's handwriting, is part of his literary remains in Berlin. It is a preliminary text of Herder's „Catechetical Explanation“ to Luther's Catechism: „Luthers Katechismus. Mit einer katechetischen Erklärung zum Gebrauch der Schulen“, which was used as a schoolbook in Sachsen-Weimar from 1798 until 1884. This manuscript seems to be an instruction book for the private (...) tutor of the Herder family. Herder explains the Apostles' creed as three „Wohltaten“ of God in a similar way as Herder himself had learned it in the Prussian catechism of his own childhood. In addition to the biblical references he also refers to chorals and contemporary poems. (shrink)

Current phenomenological approaches consider schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of the embodied self, or a disembodiment. This includes a weakening of the basic sense of self, a disruption of implicit bodily functioning, and a disconnection from the intercorporality with others. As a result of this disembodiment, the pre-reflective, practical immersion of the self in the shared world is lost. Instead, the relationship of self and world is in constant need of reconstruction by deliberate efforts, leading to the growing perplexity and (...) hyperreflexive ruminations that are found in schizophrenic patients. The paper distinguishes different levels of self-experience and relates it to the psychopathology of schizophrenia. (shrink)

The article presents a critical survey of the philosophical discussion of the mind-body-problem since the collapse of Rylean behaviourism. The major theories (identity theories, supervenience, emergentist materialism, dualist interactionism and functionalism) are sketched and briefly evaluated with regard to their advantages and disadvantages. The conclusion is that no satisfactory theory about the relation between mental and neurophysiological states exists today, but considerable progress has been made regarding the contours of this cluster of problems. A catalogue of criteria which every future (...) theory concerning the mind-body problem must fulfill is given at the end. (shrink)

Remarks on Interpretation, Confirmation and Progressiveness of Early Matrix Mechanics. Our note discusses a case study in view of questions of theory-choice. We examine the extent to which the first 'complete, consistent exposition' of matrix mechanics in 1925 can be claimed to be reasonably confirmed, well interpreted and fruitful. Various strategies, by means of deductions and otherwise, by Born, Jordan and Heisenberg to establish these claims are critically assessed. It is shown that the outcome of the Bothe-Geiger experiment does not (...) represent a 'direct' confirmation of the theory. Finally we pose the question of progressiveness and argue for a low over-all 'problem-solving effectiveness'. (shrink)

In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. The human form of life thus constituted (...) is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it. (shrink)

Diese Analytische Einführung behandelt die wichtigsten Grundfragen und -probleme der Erkenntnistheorie und enthält eine ausführliche Darstellung von Positionen und Argumenten aus der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. Sie richtet sich an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fachgebiete, bietet aber auch für philosophische Kenner eine gewinnbringende kritische Orientierung. Für die zweite Auflage wurde der Text vollständig überarbeitet, um die jüngsten Entwicklungen im Themenfeld zu berücksichtigen. Am Ende jedes Kapitels gibt es nun Studienfragen zur selbständigen Rekapitulation und kommentierte Hinweise auf wichtige neue und weiterführende Literatur. (...) Im Anhang finden sich Vorschläge für thematisch fokussierte Lehrveranstaltungen auf der Grundlage dieses Buches. Behandelt werden u.a. die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundbegriffe sowie unterschiedliche Antworten auf die Fragen nach der Struktur, dem Umfang und den Quellen menschlichen Wissens. Die spezifischen Wissensarten kommen ausführlich zur Sprache. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt außerdem auf der Rolle der Erkenntnistheorie innerhalb der Philosophie sowie ihrem Verhältnis zu den Einzelwissenschaften. (shrink)

As a rule, mental illnesses are connected with increased self-observation, a narrowing of attention to one′s own person, and with the backward turn of thinking to what has already been done or has happened. These phenomena can be summed up in the concept of hyperreflexivity. In this paper, this concept is interpreted against the background of Plessner′s distinction between the lived and the objective body as implying always already a component of self-alienation. This will be illustrated in a number of (...) psychopathological conditions such as insomnia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, hypochondria and schizophrenia. (shrink)

Wie wird Kunst in sozialen Prozessen wirksam? Welche Rolle spielen Stereotypen in der Begegnung? Wie hängen Wahrnehmen und Handeln zusammen? Dieses Buch ist ein Plädoyer für die Bilder im Zeitalter großer sozio-politischer Wandlungen. Arbeiten von Tania Bruguera, Isaac Julien, Nikki S. Lee, Teresa Margolles, Adrian Piper, Santiago Sierra und Lorna Simpson werden als performative Räume erschlossen. In den Bildern kommen andere Menschen sehr nahe und die am Werk Teilhabenden begegnen sich selbst in ihnen. Begehren und Diskriminieren der Anderen werden als (...) essenzielle Bewusstseinsprozesse reflektierbar. Stereotype Repräsentationen kommen in Bewegung. Die Interaktion der äußeren und inneren Bilder löst dialogische Prozesse aus, die Wahrnehmen und Handeln nachhaltig verändern. Thomas R. Huber unternimmt einen methodisch innovativen Brückenschlag zwischen Identitätspolitik, Ethik und Ästhetik und macht so Kunst als sozio-politisches Agens greifbar. (shrink)

The paper delineates a modern conception of second nature that takes shape around 1800. Instead of just repeating, once again, the ancient topos that habit is a second nature, this modern conception makes use of a different paradigm for the understanding of cultural self-production, namely the work of art. According to this conception, the development of a second nature is not a question of mere habituation, but rather an essentially creative and expressive process whereby we take up nature and reorganize (...) it in such a way that it points beyond itself and becomes expressive beyond subjective mastery. The formation of culture and the production of a second nature is thus revealed as an aesthetic practice, a complex dialectical exercise, and a social practice of objectification. This conception of second nature which the paper traces back to Kant, Schiller, and Hegel not only allows us to grasp the relationship between spirit and nature more adequately than some of the neo-Aristotelian conceptions that dominate the current philosophical debate. It also opens up an instructive critical perspective on our contemporary aesthetic self-understanding. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as an extreme retributivist, but recently commentators emphasize the importance of deterrence in Kant's basic justification of punishment. Kant's combination of deterrence and retributive elements, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. To interpret Kant as merely adding retributive side-constraints to a basic deterrence aim fails to capture fully the retributive strain in Kant's thought. The basic questions are: who should be punished, how much, in what manner, and why? Kant held that all (...) and only the legally guilty ought to be punished, the legally guilty being also morally guilty, except when the legal requirement was to do something "immoral in itself." This case aside, violations of law also transgress an ethical duty to obey the law. Criminal punishments should be designed to match victims' empirically discernable losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals, which depends on their inner "will." "Punishment" is not a mere disincentive in a "price" system of social control; it has an inherent expressive function, conveying a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct in question. Understanding this together with Kant's basic theory of justice may help to explain his acceptance of ius talionis and condemnation of making exceptions for pragmatic reasons. It also accounts for the retributive "tone" of Kant's remarks, despite his insistence that public courts deal only with "external actions," not overall moral worth and character assessment. Kant wird oft als Vertreter einer extremen Vergeltungstheorie gesehen. Auf der anderen Seite betonen verschiedene Autoren in der letzten Zeit die Abschreckung als grundlegendes Element in Kants Rechtfertigung der Strafe. Ihnen gegenüber muß Kants Verknüpfung von Vergeltung und Abschreckung von anderen ähnlichen Verknüpfungen unterschieden werden, die weniger plausibel sind. Kant so zu interpretieren, als füge er zum Hauptziel der Abschreckung nur einige nebensächliche Elemente der Vergeltung hinzu, verfehlt den Vergeltungsaspekt in Kants Straftheorie. Die grundlegenden Fragen sind: Wer soll bestraft werden, wie schwer, in welcher Weise und warum? Kant war der Ansicht, daß alle, aber auch nur diejenigen bestraft werden sollen, die sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht haben. Wer sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht hat, hat sich auch moralisch schuldig gemacht, es sei denn, das vom Recht Geforderte sei etwas "an sich selbst Unmoralisches". Sieht man von diesem letzteren Fall einmal ab, dann enthält jede Übertretung des juridischen Gesetzes immer auch eine Verletzung der ethischen Pflicht, dem juridischen Gesetz zu gehorchen. Strafe sollte darauf angelegt sein, den empirisch erkennbaren Verlusten des Opfers nach Art und Ausmaß zu entsprechen, außer, wenn dies unmöglich oder erniedrigend wäre; Gerichte können die tatsächliche moralische Schuld von Verbrechern, die von ihrem inneren "Willen" abhängt, nicht messen. "Strafe" ist kein bloßes Abschreckungsmittel in einem "Preis"-System sozialer Kontrolle. Statt dessen hat sie die ganz wesentliche und ausdrückliche Funktion, die moralische Mißbilligung des jeweiligen verbrecherischen Verhaltens öffentlich zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Diese Interpretation, zusammen mit Kants grundlegender Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, kann helfen zu verstehen, warum Kant das ius talionis akzeptiert hat und warum er Ausnahmen, die aus pragmatischen Gründen gemacht werden, mißbilligt. Sie erklärt auch den "Tonfall" in Kants Äußerungen, der mir seiner Vergeltungstheorie zusammenhängt, auch wenn Kant darauf beharrt, daß staatliche Gerichte sich immer nur mit "äußeren" Handlungen befassen, nicht mit dem moralischen Wert insgesamt oder mit einer Beurteilung des Charakters einer Person. (shrink)

From a neuroconstructivistic point of view, the human brain produces an internal simulation of the external world which appears in conscious experience as the phenomenal world. This concept implies in particular that the subjective body and the organic or objective body belong to fundamentally different realms, i.e. to the mental and the physical world. The spatiality of the subject-body has then to be declared an illusion, which is done by pointing to dissociations of the subject- and object-body as in the (...) rubber hand illusion or in phantom limbs. This alleged virtuality of body experience may be refuted, however, namely by referring to the intersubjectivity of perception which certifies the coextensivity of subject-body and object-body. Subjectivity is thus shown to be embodied as well as spatially extended, that means, as bodily being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap's mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally (...) positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap's non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap's persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris's and Kaplan's pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy. (shrink)

Stanley Milgram was the first who tried to apply the results of his experiment on National Socialism. Historical science has hardly picked up on this subject with the exception of the American historian Christopher Browning. Despite of some serious problems which have occured by transferring the Milgram-experiment onto National Socialism we are convinced that the possibilities Milgram has opened up for contemporary history have not been exhausted yet. In this connection we would like to plead for a stronger distinction of (...) types of perpetrators, taking into account the latest results in criminology. The Milgram-experiment refers methodically to local studies of massacres and genocides. Its application on the bureaucracy of destruction seems particularly promising to us. Also, there should be included the rescuers of jews into the research on perpetrators as a controlling body. (shrink)

Un idéal est un besoin qu'on n'a pas les moyens de satisfaire immédiatement; tout idéal fait done appel à la création de moyens. Certains idéaux sont éventuellement réalisés une fois pour toutes et cessent ainsi d'opérer comme idéaux. Certains sont simplement inépuisables; ils ne peuvent pas être accomplis une fois pour toutes — soit, comme la beauté, qu'ils ne se satisfassent pas d'une réalisation particulière; soit, comme l'éducation libérale, que leur limite recule au fur et à mesure qu'on s'en rapproche. (...) D'énormes institutions culturelles et traditionnelles se créent alors pour traduire l'effort par lequel l'homme tend vers eux. Dans une société où manque le nécessaire — nourriture, logement, vêtement — l'acquisition et la distribution des produits alimentaires monopolisent tellement l'attention des dirigeants que les besoins culturels y inspirent rarement des programmes d'action à longue portée. Les rites religieux ne font pas exception comme on pourrait le croire: le besoin de se concilier les dieux qui règlent un monde mystérieux et terrifiant est ressenti comme urgent; mais les moyens de l'assouvir, rituels et magiques, ne manquent pas. Ce besoin-là est vite satisfait, et done ne sert pas, dans ces conditions primitives, d'idéal capable de fonder un programme à longue éehéance, des institutions compliquées; ce n'est pas un but lointain dans l'accomplissement duquel concourent les efforts de générations successives. (shrink)

The varied reception history of Victor Hugo's novel L'Homme qui rit (1869) is outlined in the context of exemplary historicisations of the "laughing face"-character. This reconstruction deals with the interplay of aesthetics and passion, on the one hand, and with the effects of intermedia encounters of literature, photography and film, on the other. Not only the traditional naturalisation of medieval penalty practices (by defacing) is investigated, but also the modern media history of celebrities.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 251-263 [Access article in PDF] Notes and Discussions Nietzsche's Knowledge of Kierkegaard I. TWO OF THE MOST INTERESTING and influential of nineteenth-century thinkers are Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. There exist many striking similarities between the two: they were both critics of rationality, of idealism, and of the building of philosophical systems. Instead, their approach was more existential and psychological and they both (...) strongly emphasized the central position of the individual, personality, and subjectivity. There also exist important differences and oppositions between their thinking—of which the most important is the fact that Kierkegaard was a profoundly Christian-religious thinker, while Nietzsche regarded Christianity and religion as his main object of attack.Kierkegaard (1813-55) certainly could have had no knowledge of Nietzsche (1844-1900), and it is generally assumed that Nietzsche, apart from the name, had no knowledge of Kierkegaard's thinking. What makes it particularly tempting to discuss Nietzsche's relation to Kierkegaard, apart from their inherent similarities and differences and the fact that they are often discussed together, is that Nietzsche, in a letter to Georg Brandes from February 19, 1888, claims that he intended to study Kierkegaard: Ich habe mir für meine nächste Reise nach Deutschland vorgesetzt, mich mit dem psychologischen Problem Kierkegaard zu beschäftigen, insgleichen die Bekanntschaft mit Ihrer älteren Litteratur zu erneuern. Dies wird für mich, im besten Sinn des Worts, von Nutzen sein,—und wird dazu dienen, mir meine eigne Härte und Anmaaßung im Urtheil "zu Gemüthe zu führen."1 [End Page 251]Nietzsche lived in Nice when he wrote this, and never returned to Germany before his mental collapse in January 1889. Nietzsche's intention to study Kierkegaard was expressed in response to a letter from Brandes, where he recommended Kierkegaard to him. Es giebt ein nordischer Schriftsteller, dessen Werke Sie interessiren würden, wenn Sie nur übersetzt wären, Sören Kierkegaard, er lebte 1813-55 und ist meiner Ansicht nach einer der tiefsten Psychologen, die es überhaupt giebt. Ein Büchlein, das ich über ihn geschrieben habe (übersetzt Leipzig 1879) giebt keine hinreichende Vorstellung von seinem Genie, denn dies Buch ist eine Art von Streitschrift, geschrieben um seinen Einfluss zu hemmen. Es ist wohl aber in psychologischer Hinsicht entschieden das feinste, was ich veröffentlicht habe.2Much has been written about Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. There exist more than thirty studies which extensively treat this topic, 3 and it has been briefly mentioned or discussed by hundreds of commentators. Every commentator so far seems to have assumed that Nietzsche had no knowledge of Kierkegaard—except the little Brandes had mentioned in his letter from 1888. 4It is a common belief that Kierkegaard was internationally discovered first after the turn of the century. This is, however, true only in a very qualified sense. 5 [End Page 252] There existed, counter to Brandes' assumption in the letter quoted above, a fairly large number of works by Kierkegaard in German translation already before 1889 which Nietzsche theoretically could have read. However, with very high probability he had not read any of them, because his statement to Brandes would then have been differently formulated.However, there exist other—until now unknown—sources for Nietzsche's knowledge about Kierkegaard. These sources are books Nietzsche read which contain discussions of, and quotations from, Kierkegaard. I have identified six such books which Nietzsche definitely read, some more and some less important. Together these accounts contain about five full pages of quotations from Kierkegaard and about fifty pages about him. To this can be added other sources such as Brandes' letter where he recommends Nietzsche to read Kierkegaard, and philosophical and theological journals which discuss Kierkegaard and personal relationships to those who had knowledge of Kierkegaard's thinking (such as Franz Overbeck and Lou Salomé).Nietzsche's encounter with Kierkegaard's thinking and writing through secondary sources are, in rough chronological order: 6(1) Nietzsche had already in the 1870s read (or, rather, had read to him) parts of Brandes... (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEin Gutteil von Schellings Freiheitsschrift ist dem Problem der Theodizee gewidmet. Schelling setzt sich darin mit einigen Pfeilern des Leibnizschen Theodizeekonzepts auseinander, die bis heute als argumentativer Höhepunkt rationaler Theodizee angesehen werden. Aus einer berechtigten Kritik an Leibniz in drei Punkten entwickelt Schelling aber ein verbessertes Konzept, das auf der Idee eines geschichtlich mithandelnden Gottes fußt: Die von Schelling gegen Leibniz eingeforderte Positivität des Bösen macht die Möglichkeit des Bösen zum Definitionsmerkmal des höchsten durch eine Schöpfung realisierbaren Gutes, nämlich der (...) menschlichen Freiheit. Der Begriff der Möglichkeit überhaupt bedarf, um vollständig zu sein, nicht nur der Widerspruchsfreiheit ihres Inhalts, sondern auch der Kompatibilität dieses Inhalts relativ auf einen dafür vorauszusetzenden, sie vermögenden Träger. Gott als Träger ›böser Möglichkeit‹ ist auszuscheiden. Deshalb muss im Falle der Erschaffung irgendeiner Welt zuerst der geschaffene Mensch in seiner Freiheit existieren, bevor die ihn einschließende mögliche Welt in Beziehung auf die Realisierung der bösen oder aber guten Möglichkeiten bestimmt sein kann. Die Leibnizsche Voraussetzung einer Wahl Gottes zwischen vielen möglichen Welten, deren beste als conditio sine qua non dennoch das Böse enthält, als Begründung von dessen Freiheit muss daher von Schelling zurückgewiesen werden. Denn angesichts der Güte und Allmacht seines eigenen Wesens kann Gott nur eine einzige mögliche und zugleich maximal gute Welt zur Erschaffung offenstehen: das »System der Freiheit« in Gemeinschaft mit den Menschen. Gott erschafft diese einzig mögliche Welt aus freien Stücken genau dann, wenn er sich zugleich für fähig und willens erkennt, alle vorausgesehenen Folgen einer freien Entscheidung des Menschen zum Bösen durch sein eigenes geschichtliches Mithandeln wieder zum Guten zu wenden.SUMMARYIn his Freiheitsschrift, Schelling discusses some of the main arguments of the Leibnizian conception of theodicy. These are considered even today as an argumentative summit of rational elucidation of the existence of evil in a world which supposedly could be only created by a God with good intentions. However, Schelling criticizes Leibniz legitimately on three points and develops a revised solution that is based on the idea of a God that freely co-acts within human history: Schelling demands against Leibniz that evil, should it exist at all, be a positive reality and not an expression of mere defect. This turns the possibility of evil into one of the defining characteristics of the highest good that a creation might bring into being: human freedom. In order to be complete, the concept of possibility in general requires not only the absence of contradiction in its content, but also that this content be compatible with some already existent bearer which at least in principle would be capable of its realization. But God as creator of every being except of himself is necessarily incompatible with ‘evil possibility’. So it is impossible that some evil in whatever possible world would be real by a divine election. Therefore, in any case of a creation of some world, the created human being must first exist in freedom before the possible world that includes him can be determined regarding the realization of evil possibilities or, in contrast, of those that avoid evil. As a consequence, Schelling rejects Leibniz's idea of a divine choice between many possible worlds as justification of God's freedom and election of the best one which would unavoidably include, as a conditio sine qua non, the realization of some evil. Instead, there is with respect to his own moral excellence only one possible and at the same time wholly perfect world open to God's creativity: the “system of freedom”. Conscious of his own goodness and omnipotence, God creates this single possible world out of freedom if and only if he recognizes himself as willing and able to turn around, by his own co-action in history, all foreseen consequences of a free human choice of evil. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Heft des Philosophischen Jahrbuchs versucht, der der Philosophie eigenen und für sie unverzichtbaren Streitkultur jenseits ideologischer Beschränkungen Raum zu geben. Das dokumentieren nicht nur die beiden Beiträge zur Relektüre des Klassikers Utopia und zur Entwicklung des Verstehens von Wahrnehmung und Perspektivität oder der Diskussionsbericht über Rahel Jaeggis Sozialkritik, sondern auch die nunmehr sechste Jahrbuch-Kontroverse zur „New Political Ontology for a Mature Information Society“ von Luciano Floridi, dessen im letzten Heft erschienener Initiativbeitrag hier nun im gewohnten Format kontrovers diskutiert (...) wird. (shrink)

Scotus is notorious for occasionally making statements that, on their face at least, smack of voluntarism, but there has been a lively debate about whether Scotus is really a voluntarist after all. Now the debate is not over whether Scotus lays great emphasis on the role of the divine will with respect to the moral law. No one could sensibly deny that he does, and if such an emphasis constitutes voluntarism, then no one could sensibly deny that Scotus is a (...) voluntarist. As I am using the word, however, voluntarism is the view that (i) the goodness of almost all things, as well as the rightness of almost all acts, depends wholly on the divine will and (ii) what God wills with respect to those things and those acts is not in turn to be explained by reference to the divine intellect, human nature, or anything else. This is the view that Scotus’s critics decry and his defenders disclaim. Thus, his critics have seized on these passages and accused Scotus of believing that the moral law depends simply on “the arbitrary will of God.” His most sympathetic interpreters, however, have devoted great ingenuity to showing that Scotus did not mean anything unpalatable by these statements.1 What the critics and defenders apparently have in common is the view that voluntarism is an implausible and even discreditable doctrine. Interpreters who read Scotus as a voluntarist intend thereby to damn his moral views; interpreters sympathetic to his moral views feel compelled to mitigate his voluntarism. I wish to argue for a different approach. I agree with his defenders that Scotus’s moral philosophy ought to be taken seriously. But I think the best way to take any philosopher’s view seriously is to let him speak for himself, not to decide in advance that he must not have held a view that we find implausible. Let me suggest an analogy that will make my position clearer. Very nearly everyone finds immaterialism implausible. (shrink)

Die nach den Konventionen der Alten Geschichte gemeinhin mit dem Beginn der Regierungszeit des Kaisers Diokletian (284 n. Chr.) einsetzende Epoche der Spätantike (die Papyrologen sprechen seit diesem Zeitpunkt dagegen zumeist von der „Byzantinischen Zeit“) zeitigte eine Fülle von administrativen und fiskalischen Reformen, die sich auch in Änderungen der Zeitrechnung in den Provinzen des Reiches niederschlugen. Am besten studieren lassen sich diese Auswirkungen in der Provinz Ägypten, wo mit den Papyri eine Fülle von datierten administrativen Aufzeichnungen sowie öffentlichen und privaten (...) Urkunden zur Verfügung steht. Hier manifestiert sich in diesen Phänomenen zugleich die zunehmende Angleichung Ägyptens an die administrativen und fiskalischen Strukturen in den anderen Provinzen des Reiches, wenn man so will die „Romanisierung“ Ägyptens, deren Ergebnis das Verschwinden zahlreicher Besonderheiten war, durch welche sich in der frühen und hohen Kaiserzeit die Verhältnisse in Ägypten von denen in den übrigen Teilen des Reiches signifikant unterschieden haben, wenngleich dieser Umstand es nach der Auffassung des Rez. keinesfalls rechtfertigt, der Provinz als solcher einen Sonderstatus im römischen Reichsverband zuzuschreiben, wie dies eine traditionelle Richtung der althistorischen Forschung lange Zeit getan hat und teilweise immer noch tut. Die weltweit besten Kenner der diversen chronologischen Systeme des byzantinischen Ägypten und der mit ihnen zusammenhängenden, z. T. äußerst verwickelten Probleme sind zweifellos Roger S. Bagnall und Klaas A. Worp (B&W), die bereits vor 27 Jahren mit den „Chronological systems of Byzantine Egypt“ (CSBE. Studia Amstelodamensia, VIII. Zutphen 1978) eine Summe der aus ihrer Editionstätigkeit erwachsenden intensiven Beschäftigung mit den chronologischen Problemen byzantinischer Urkunden aus Ägypten vorgelegt und nicht nur dem Editor solcher Dokumente im besonderen, sondern auch der historischen und papyrologischen Forschung im allgemeinen ein unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel an die Hand gegeben haben. Schon ein Jahr später folgten mit den aus ihrer Feder stammenden „Regnal Formulas in Byzantine Egypt“ (RFBE. Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists, Supplement 2. Missoula/Montana 1979) und 1987 mit den zusammen mit A. Cameron und S. Schwartz verfaßten „Consuls of the Later Roman Empire“ (CLRE) zwei weitere solcher unverzichtbaren Hilfsmittel, die den auf dem Gebiet der epigraphischen und papyrologischen Hinterlassenschaft der Spätantike tätigen Forschern die Arbeit beträchtlich erleichtern. In Anbetracht des in der seit dem Erscheinen von CSBE vestrichenen Zeit enorm angewachsenen Quellenmaterials, welches nicht nur vielfältige neue chronologische Probleme aufwarf, sondern auch bereits bekannte in neuem Licht erscheinen ließ – einen Prozeß, den B&W mit zahlreichen Artikeln zur Chronologie der Papyrusdokumente des byzantinischen Ägypten (siehe die Bibliographie in CSBE) gewissermaßen kommentierend begleitet haben – bedarf diese Neuauflage der CSBE sicherlich keiner Rechtfertigung. Auch wenn mit der Volltextdatenbank der „Duke Data Bank of Documentary Papyri“ (DDBDP) sowie mit dem „Heidelberger Gesamtverzeichnis der griechischen Papyrusurkunden Ägyptens“ (HGV) nunmehr – zum Zeitpunkt der Erstauflage der CSBE noch nicht existente – äußerst nützliche digitale Ressourcen zur Verfügung stehen, die die Sammlung und chronologische Auswertung der Dokumente bedeutend erleichtern (worauf B&W in der Einleitung zu CSBE zu recht hinweisen [viii]), so ist dies zweifellos immer noch eine mühe- und entsagungsvolle Kärrnerarbeit, für die den beiden Autoren nicht hoch genug gedankt werden kann. Hinzu kommt, daß sich diese Arbeit nicht nur auf die Sammlung der Dokumente und der ggfs. seit ihrer Edition erfolgten Berichtigungen beschränkt, sondern B&W in zahlreichen Fällen auch selbst Lesungen überprüft und berichtigt haben. (shrink)

The way in which a schema represents something is precisely by abstracting from some of its features; in a schema, representation and abstraction are thus not opposed to each other but rather internally related. The first part of this paper investigates this internal relation by delineating Kant’s concept of schema as the term mediating concept and intuition. Due to its pivotal position, however, the schema tends to collapse either into the conceptual or into the intuitive. The second part of the (...) paper turns to Heidegger who tries to overcome this difficulty: he does not conceive the schema as a supplementary representation that connects already determinate concepts and intuitions, but rather locates schematization immanently in the very articulation of concept and intuition themselves. The third part of the paper proposes that the schematicity of our representations can be reflected in three pictorial strategies that are important for contemporary art: reduction, serialization, and reconstruction. These strategies are exemplified in certain images which put us in a position to see through our own representational form, as it were, and observe the procedures of figuration involved in that very form. (shrink)

This paper puts two propositions to the test: First, gratitude and active ingratitude are in one sense opposed, yet in another sense they bear a striking resemblance. Second, mature morality sometimes expects us to transcend the quid pro quo structure implied by common gratitude.